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NOTES
STOP THE PRESSES: REPORTER-SOURCE
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS AND THE
CASE FOR ENFORCEMENT
Stories of heroic reporters sacrificing their freedom by going
to jail to protect confidential sources present interesting and difficult
questions about the unique role of the press in our society.' There
is, however, a closely related and converse problem, which com-
mentators have not often discussed, that presents a similar legal
issue. When a reporter, contrary to a prior agreement with his or
her source, chooses to publish information that he or she agreed to
keep confidential, it is unclear whether the source may successfully
sue the reporter for breach of contract. 2 This issue presents a par-
ticularly interesting and important question because it involves a
clash between the need to enforce private agreements and compen-
sate private harms on the one hand, and the need to extend special
protection to the press under the First Amendment on the other. 5
Courts must consider several competing factors in determining
whether to enforce reporter-source confidentiality agreements. 4
Under traditional contract law, the agreements might very well
contain all the requisite elements of a binding contract. 5 Reporter-
1 See generally Vince Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV.
229 (1971).
I See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen r), 445 N.W.2d 248, 254 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990) ("Cohen II"), rev'd, 111
S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III").
See generally Michael Dicke, Note, Promises and the Press: First Amendment Limitations on
News Source Recovery for Breach of a Confidentiality Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1553 (1989).
See generally id.
5 Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 202.
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source agreements, however, are often oral and vague in their
terms, thus making their interpretation difficult. 6 Also, a court
might question whether the parties to such agreements intend to
be legally bound rather than simply morally bound.' Moreover,
aside from these traditional contract issues, courts must consider
whether to apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel when a source
has reasonably and detrimentally relied upon a reporter's promise
of confidentiality. 8
In addition to contract issues, reporters faced with breach of
contract actions have raised First Amendment issues as well. 9 The
First Amendment, however, only prohibits state action that restricts
press freedom and does not affect similar actions by private indi-
viduals.° Further, in certain circumstances, persons may effectively
waive their First Amendment rights." Finally, even if state action
was present and no waiver existed, courts must weigh First Amend-
ment concerns against the need to enforce the contract. 12
A 1991 United States Supreme Court case, Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co.,l 3 is the leading decision among the few that have ad-
dressed the issue of the enforceability of reporter-source confiden-
tiality agreements.' 4 In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court
6 Id. at 203; see also Richard J. Tofel, Under Inspection, NATI L. J., March 12, 1990, at
13, 14. That an agreement is oral does not alone generally make it unenforceable, but the
fact that reporter-source agreements have traditionally been oral has been said to cause
uncertainty with respect to the specific terms agreed upon. See Tofel, supra, at 14.
Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 203 (court stated that "a moral obligation alone will not
support a contract"); see also Tofel, supra note 6, at 13 (commentator likened the reporter-
source promise to the traditionally unenforceable promise to marry).
8 Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 203-05; Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen III"), I I I S. Ct.
2513, 2517-20 (1991). Promissory estoppel is an equitable remedy that has been applied
where a binding contract could not otherwise be found. See infra notes 116-39 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of promissory estoppel.
9 See, e.g., Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1295-1301 (D.
Minn. 1990), modified, 939 F.2d 578, 584 (8th Cir. 1991); Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 204.
Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1295; Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen I"), 445 N.W.2d
248, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990)
("Cohen II"), rev'd, 111  S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III").
" Erie Telecommunications, Inc., v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1094 (3d Cir. 1988);
Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1296-98; Cohen I, 445 N.W.2d at 258.
12
 Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1298-99; Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 205; Cohen I, 445 N.W.2d
at 256-58.
" Cohen III, 111 S. Ct. at 2520.
" Only a few other courts have dealt in any way with this issue. See Ruzicka, 733 F.
Supp. at 1293 n.2. In Ruzicka, a sexual assault victim sued a magazine for revealing her
identity. Id. at 1292. See infra notes 70-91 for a discussion of that case. See also Doe v. ABC,
543 N.Y.S.2d 455, 455 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). In Doe v. ABC, rape victims sued a television
station for breach of contract and negligent infliction of emotional distress after an alleged
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held that the enforcement of such a confidentiality agreement
would impermissibly burden the newspaper's First Amendment
rights.i 5 On certiorari, however, the United States Supreme Court
held that a court's enforcement of the agreement under a promis-
sory estoppel theory would not violate the newspaper's First
Amendment rights.'6
Section I of this note briefly introduces the seminal cases in-
volving reporter-source breach of contract actions." Section II dis-
cusses the contractual issues, including .promissory estoppel, ad-
failure of the station to protect the plaintiffs' anonymity. Id. at 456 (Rosenberger, J., dis-
senting). The court summarily affirmed the judgment below, which denied the defendants'
motion for summary judgment on the contract claim. There was no discussion by the court,
however, of its reasoning as to the contract claim. Id. at 455-56. Vireili v. Goodson-Tod man
Enters., 536 N.Y.S.2d 571, 577 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), involved a suit brought against a
newspaper, reporter and publisher for invasion of privacy, negligence and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress; the suit alleged that the newspaper made the plaintiffs, interviewees
for a drug article, identifiable. Id. at 572-73. It did not, however, involve a breach of contract
claim and is therefore beyond the scope of this note, In Huskey v. NBC, 632 F. Supp. 1282,
1294 (N.D. Ill. 1986), a prisoner brought an action against NBC alleging invasion of privacy
and breach of the company's contract to abide by federal regulations prohibiting nonconsen-
sual photographing of inmates. Id. at 1285. The decision established only that the prisoner
had stated a cause of action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and that the defendant was
required to answer. Id. at 1294. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 41 (Cal. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979), involved a suit by a psychologist against a member of a
therapy group who published a novel allegedly disclosing facts about the therapy sessions in
violation of a written agreement. Id. at 33-34. The court held that a therapist could not
prevent a patient from reporting the treatment he or she received. Id. at 41. The case is
beyond the scope of this note as it dealt with a doctor-patient relationship and involved a
separate set of issues, Cullen v. Grove Press Inc., 276 F. Supp. 727, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), was
an action for defamation and invasion of privacy brought by officers of a correctional facility.
Id. at 728. Among their claims, plaintiffs alleged that the release of a film depicting life in
the prison violated an understanding regarding the content and use of the film. The court
summarily concluded that the First Amendment provided protection for the film. Id, at 731.
Finally, Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hospital, 573 N.Y.S.2d 828 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991),
involved a suit by an AIDS victim against a doctor and a hospital who, as third party plaintiffs,
brought a claim against a publishing company for indemnification or contribution. Id. at 829.
The third party plaintiffs relied on various theories of recovery, including a breach of contract
theory. Id. The first party plaintiff's claim had been for injuries arising out of the publication
of a photograph of the first party plaintiff that allegedly breached an agreement that he
would not be recognizable from the photograph. Id, at 829-30. The court's discussion of the
federal First Amendment issue was brief because the court reasoned that it was compelled
by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. See id. at 830.
The court did not consider that the Supreme Court's decision was limited to a discussion of
promissory estoppel. See id. The remainder of the Anderson decision discussed the scope of
the New York State Constitution's free speech provision and concluded that even the broader
state provision could not insulate the third party defendants from the contract cause of
action. See id. at 831.
15 Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 205.
16 Cohen III, 111 S. Ct. at 2520.
17 See infra notes 21-91 and accompanying text.
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dressed by courts when considering the enforceability of reporter-
source confidentiality agreements.' 8 Section III discusses the First
Amendment issues raised by these agreements, including state ac-
tion, contractual waiver and the balancing of First Amendment
against contractual interests. 19 Finally, Section IV analyzes the com-
peting contractual and constitutional issues and concludes that the
First Amendment should not be applied at all in this area and that,
if it is applied, the need to enforce these agreements ultimately
outweighs any burden on the First Amendment rights of news
organizations."
I. CASES ANALYZING THE REPORTER-SOURCE CONFIDENTIALITY
AGREEMENT PROBLEM: COHEN AND RUZICKA
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., a 1991 United States Supreme Court
case, is the principal case that confronts and squarely discusses the
enforceability of reporter-source confidentiality agreements." In
October of 1982, the plaintiff, Dan Cohen, was employed by an
advertising agency that worked for Wheelock Whitney, the Repub-
lican party gubernatorial candidate in Minnesota. 22 Cohen had ob-
tained court documents regarding two prior arrests of Marlene
Johnson, the Democratic party candidate for Lieutenant Governor,
and he approached several reporters with this information, includ-
ing Lori Sturdevant of the Minneapolis Star and Tribune ("Tri-
bune") and Bill Salisbury of the St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch
("Dispatch"). 25
Before turning the information over, however, Cohen expressly
requested oral assurances from all of the reporters that he would
not be named in any resulting stories and that he would not be
"9 See infra notes 92-139 and accompanying text.
1 ° See infra notes 140-265 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 266-340 and accompanying text.
21 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen III"), 111  S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991).
" Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen I"), 445 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990) ("Cohen in, rev'd, I 1 1 S. Ct.
2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III"). Whitney was a member of the so-called "Independent
Republican" party, as the Republican party is referred to in Minnesota. Id.
23 Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 200. Johnson was a member of the so-called "Democratic-
Farmer-Labor" party, as the Democratic party is referred to in Minnesota. Cohen I, 445
N.W.2d at 252. Cohen also contacted Gerry Nelson of the Associated Press and David Nimmer
of WCCO Television and gave them the information subject to the same confidentiality
requirement. Nelson and the Associated Press honored their promise by not including
Cohen's name in its story. WCCO did not run a story at all. Id. at 252-53.
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questioned regarding his own source. 24 After agreeing to the con-
ditions and obtaining the documents, the two newspapers inter-
viewed Johnson and discovered that the arrests were insignificant. 25
The reporters realized that the insignificance of the arrests might
in fact create a "boomerang effect" against the Whitney campaign
because of Cohen's close connection to Whitney. 26 In addition, an-
other Tribune reporter searched the original court records and
discovered that Gary Flakne, who was known to be a Wheelock
Whitney supporter, had checked out the records the day before. 27
When contacted, Flakne informed the reporter that he had obtained
the records for Cohen. 28
Because of the potential boomerang effect and the close con-
nection of Cohen and Flakne to the Whitney campaign, both news-
papers reconsidered their promises of confidentiality. 29 The Tri-
bune staff decided that they could not ignore the story altogether
without risking accusations of suppressing information damaging
to the local Democratic party." Similarly, they also rejected the
option of printing the story without Cohen's name and simply de-
scribing the source as a Whitney supporter or campaign member. 31
Sturdevant, one of the reporters, expressed strong objections to
revealing Cohen's name, but she did agree to try to persuade Cohen
to allow the newspaper to include his name. 32 Unsuccessful in these
efforts, Sturdevant wrote the story but requested that her name not
24 Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 200. According to the court, Cohen said the following, In
so many words":
I have some documents which may or may not relate to a candidate in the
upcoming election, and if you will give me a promise of confidentiality, that is
that 1 will be treated as an anonymous source, that my name will not appear in
any material in connection with this, and you will also agree that you're not
going to pursue with me a question of who my source is, then I'll furnish you
with the documents.
Id.
25 Id. at 200-01, 201 n.2. The first arrest was a 1969 case against Johnson (later
dismissed) for unlawful assembly in connection with the candidate's protest of the city's
failure to hire minorities for construction projects. The second was a conviction for petit
theft involving Johnson's leaving a store with six dollars of merchandise at a time when she
was upset over the death of her father. Id.
29 Id. at 201 n.2.
" Id. at 201.
29 Id.
29 Id. at 201 n.2; Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen I"), 445 N.W.2d 248, 253 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1989), aff 'd in part, rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990) ("Cohen II"),
rev'd, 111  S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen nr).
30 Cohen 1, 445 N.W.2d at 253.
31 Id.
32 Id.
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be put on it." On October 28, 1982, the Tribune ran the story with
Cohen's name appearing as the source of the information. 34 The
story also included the name of Cohen's employer."
The Dispatch staff did not engage in quite so extensive a debate
as the Tribune staff had, but the reporter, Salisbury, did raise
similar objections to printing Cohen's name. 36 Nevertheless, Salis-
bury allowed his name to appear as the author of the story that was
run on October 28, the same day as the Tribune's story." Later
that same day, Cohen's employer confronted him about the articles,
and, according to Cohen, the employer fired Cohen." While the
employer contended that Cohen resigned, the newspapers con-
ceded that he was fired or at least forced to resign because of the
stories."
In response, Cohen brought claims against both newspapers
for breach of contract and misrepresentation. 4° As to the breach of
contract claim, Cohen claimed that he had entered a binding con-
tract with the newspapers, exchanging information for confiden-
tiality.'" He asserted that the publication of his name in connection
with the stories was a breach of that agreement, and he claimed
both compensatory damages (the loss of his job) and punitive dam-
ages. 42 The trial resulted in a $700,000 jury verdict in favor of
Cohen.'"
The newspapers appealed the case to the Court of Appeals of
Minnesota ("Cohen I"), claiming that the First Amendment barred
Cohen's contract claim." Specifically, the newspapers contended
that enforcement of the contract would burden the First Amend-
ment by intruding upon the editorial process. 45 Further, they
33 Id.
34 Id.
ss Id.
38 Id.
59 Id.
58 Id.
39 Id. at 253-54.
40 Id. at 254. The misrepresentation claim is beyond the scope of this note. The trial
court found for the plaintiff on this claim. Id. The appeals court, however, reversed this
result, concluding that because the reporters had intended to perform the contract at the
time they entered it, they could not be liable for misrepresentation. Id. at 259-60.
'' See id. at 254; Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen II"), 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn.
1990), rev d, Ill S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen lin.
42 See Cohen I, 445 N.W.2d at 254.
43 Id. The jury awarded $200,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive
damages. Id.
" See id. at 254, 257.
46 See id. at 257-58.
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claimed that such enforcement would burden the First Amendment
by restricting the public's access to information. 46 Thus, the news-
papers asserted that the First Amendment provides special protec-
tion to news organizations immunizing them from contract actions
based upon agreements with news sources. 47
The Minnesota appeals court held that the First Amendment
did not apply in the context of a reporter-source contract action
because no state action was sufficient to constitutionalize the dispute,
and because the newspapers had waived any First Amendment
rights by entering the contract." In addition, the court reasoned
that even if the First Amendment did apply, the interests favoring
enforcement outweighed any burden on the First Amendment.' 9
Thus, the court affirmed the jury verdict, holding that the First
Amendment does not provide special protection for media defen-
dants in reporter-source contract actions. 60
The Minnesota Supreme Court ("Cohen II"), however, reversed
the appeals court's decision regarding the breach of contract claim."
The Minnesota high court reasoned first that the special relation-
ship between a reporter and a source could not be subject to the
legal rigidity of contract law because reporters and sources do not
ordinarily intend their actions to have legal consequences." The
court also considered enforcing the agreement under a promissory
estoppel theory, whereby a court enforces a promise that is other-
wise unenforceable, but that has been relied upon by the promisee."
Due to the unique requirements of this doctrine, however, the court
concluded that such a substantive theory of enforcement necessarily
implicates the First Amendment. 54 In addressing the First Amend-
ment interests, the court concluded that, given the factual circum-
413 See id. at 257.
47 Id.
45 Id. at 254.
49 Id. at 257.
Id. at 257, 262. Note, however, that the appeals court held, for reasons not relevant
to this analysis, that the punitive damages should not have been awarded, and thus, Cohen
was awarded just the $200,000 in compensatory damages. Id. at 262.
51 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen II"), 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990), rev'd,
Ill S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III"). Note that the Minnesota high court affirmed the
appeals court's holding as to the misrepresentation claim. Id.
52 Id. at 203.
53 Id. at 203-05. The promissory estoppel theory was considered and ruled upon by the
Minnesota high court even though the issue was neither tried at the trial level nor raised by
either party at any level. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen III"), i 11 S. Ct. 2513, 2517
(1991).
61 Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 205.
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stances, such interests outweighed the need for enforcement of the
agreement." The Minnesota high court, therefore, reversed the
decision of the appeals court and held that the First Amendment
barred Cohen's contract action.56
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court ("Cohen III")
reversed the Minnesota high court and held that the First Amend-
ment did not prevent enforcement of the agreement under a prom-
issory estoppel theory. 57
 The Court, of course, did not consider the
state law contract issue. 58
 Rather, it considered only the promissory
estoppel issue because the Minnesota Supreme Court had held that
a promissory estoppel remedy was unavailable due to the federal
law limitations of the First Amendment. 59
 The United States Su-
preme Court held first that it had jurisdiction to consider the prom-
issory estoppel remedy despite the fact that it was a state law remedy
and despite the fact that the issue was neither tried before the trial
court nor presented by either party in any of the state courts below. 66
The Court reasoned that the Minnesota high court's decision to
deny the promissory estoppel remedy was based upon the Federal
Constitution and thus presented a federal question. 6 ' Moreover, the
Court reasoned that the fact that the lower court had decided a
federal law issue, whether or not it had been raised and argued by
the parties below, was enough to give the Court jurisdiction to
decide the matter. 62
In considering the substantive issue itself, the Court initially
held that there was state action involved in enforcement, by a court,
under a promissory estoppel theory. 65
 The Court reasoned that in
the absence of a true contract (which the state court had held did
not exist), the promissory estoppel doctrine would create obligations
never explicitly assumed by the parties. 64
 Because these obligations
would be enforced through the official power of the Minnesota
courts, the United States Supreme Court concluded that there
would be state action sufficient to implicate the First Amendment. 65
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Cohen III, 111  S. Ct. at 2518-19.
55 See id. at 2517; see also Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 939 F.2d 578, 581
(8th Cir. 1991).
59 See Cohen III, 111 S. Ct at 2516.
60 Id. at 2517.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 2518.
65 Id.
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Finally, however, the Court held that the First Amendment
considerations were not sufficient to bar a promissory estoppel rem-
edy.66 The Court reasoned that this case was controlled by a line of
decisions holding that generally applicable laws, which have an
incidental effect upon the press's ability to gather or report news,
do not run afoul of the the First Amendment when applied to the
press.67 In other words, because the state promissory estoppel doc-
trine did not target or single out the press in any way, the press
should not be exempted from its application on First Amendment
grounds.68 The Court, therefore, reversed the Minnesota high court
decision and remanded the case for a full consideration of the
promissory estoppel remedy. 69
Only one other case has squarely addressed the issue of the
enforceability of reporter-source confidentiality agreements." In
66 Id. at 2518-19.
67 Id. at 2518. The Court listed several cases in support of the proposition that the First
Amendment does not shield the press from various generally applicable laws: Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minneapolis Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581-83
(1983) (press not shielded from obligation to pay nondiscriminatory taxes); Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-79 (1977) (press not shielded from
copyright laws); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972) (press not shielded from the
obligation to respond to a grand jury subpoena); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394
U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (press not shielded from antitrust laws); Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1946) (press not shielded from the Fair Labor Standards
Act); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945) (press not shielded from
antitrust laws); Murdock V. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943) (press not shielded from
obligation to pay nondiscriminatory taxes); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33
(1937) (press not shielded from the National Labor Relations Act). Cohen III, Ill S. Ct. at
2518.
68 Cohen III, 111 S. Ct. at 2518-19.
69 Id. at 2519-20. The Court refused, however, to simply reinstate the trial court's
compensatory damage award because it reasoned that the Minnesota Supreme Court's con-
sideration of the state law promissory estoppel remedy may have been truncated by that
court's conclusion that the First Amendment barred such a remedy. Id.
On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court reinstated the original jury verdict granting
compensatory damages. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Minn. 1992).
The court held that because the promissory estoppel theory was closely akin to the contract
theory, it would not be unfair to the defendants for the court to apply the promissory
estoppel theory even though it had not been raised at trial. Id. at 390. Moreover, the court
held that neither Minnesota state constitutional free press protections nor notions of public
policy were sufficient to bar enforcement of the agreement. Id. at 390-91. Finally, the court
reviewed the Restatement (Second) of Contracts requirements for promissory estoppel and
concluded that the jury verdict could be reinstated, under the promissory estoppel theory,
without the necessity of remanding the case for a new trial on the issue. Id. at 391-92.
Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1293 (D. Minn. 1990),
modified, 939 F.2d 578, 584 (8th Cir. 1991). Once again, the plaintiff's suit involved other
claims not relevant to this analysis: fraudulent misrepresentation, invasion of privacy by
publication of private facts, false light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional
distress and unjust enrichment. Id. at 1292.
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1990, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota,
in Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., held that enforcement of
a reporter-source agreement, in which the reporter involved is not
apprised of exactly what information may not be published under
the agreement, violates the First Amendment."
In Ruzicka, a sexual assault victim, Jill Ruzicka, had agreed to
allow Glamour magazine to interview her for an article on sexual
abuse by therapists on the condition that she would not be "iden-
tified or identifiable."72 The reporter, Claudia Dreifus, though not
receiving a clear indication of what, beyond the plaintiff's name,
could not be published, understood that Ruzicka was concerned
about the possibility of her colleagues identifying her from the
article. 73 The ensuing article, though not disclosing the plaintiff's
name (the name "Jill Lundquist" was used instead), contained a
description of the plaintiff and her experiences that allegedly made
her identifiable. 74 In addition to a description of her sexual abuse
experiences, the article mentioned that she went to law school, that
she was now an attorney, and that she served on a task force that
drafted a statute criminalizing therapist-patient sex.75 Ruzicka could
not prove that anyone had identified her based on the article. 76
In 1988, Ruzicka brought an action against the magazine, in-
cluding a breach of contract claim. 77 She alleged that the details
included in the article made her "identifiable" and, as such, violated
the confidentiality agreement." The magazine, however, claimed
that the First Amendment provided the magazine with special pro-
tection from the contract claim. 79
Granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
district court held that a court's enforcement of the agreement
would constitute state action thus implicating the First Amendment,
and that, on the facts of the case, the magazine had not waived its
First Amendment rights. 80 Specifically, the court reasoned that the
terms of the agreement did not inform the magazine as to what
information could not be published and, therefore, the magazine
7 ' Id. at 1301.
72 Id. at 1291.
7] Id. at 1291-92.
" Id. at 1292.
" Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1291-92, 1298.
79
 Id. at 1295.
" Id. at 1296, 1298.
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could not have made a valid constitutional waiver. 81 In its First
Amendment analysis, the court considered the constitutional bur-
den that enforcement of the agreement would cause, and concluded
that the First Amendment protected the magazine from the breach
of contract claim. 82 The court balanced the interests in enforcing
the contract against the burden on the First Amendment.83 Under
this balancing test, the court reasoned that, at a minimum, if a
reporter-source contract is to be enforced, a plaintiff must show
specific, unambiguous terms of agreement in order to protect the
First Amendment interests involved.'" Because Ruzicka was unable
to prove such specific and unambiguous terms, the court concluded
that the First Amendment required that the agreement not be
enforced.85
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit sidestepped the First Amendment issue, holding that as a
matter of Minnesota state law, as set out in Cohen II, a contract cause
of action is never available in the reporter-source agreement con-
text." The Eighth Circuit stated that it was unnecessary to discuss
the district court's reasoning with respect to the First Amendment
because the contract claim was precluded under state contract law. 87
The court stated that under Minnesota law, as construed by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Cohen II, reporter-source agreements
are not enforceable because the parties do not intend to form a
binding contract.88
Finally, the Eighth Circuit, in Ruzicka, also recognized that a .
promissory estoppel remedy may be available in the reporter-source
context." Once again relying on Cohen, the court recognized that
in narrow circumstances the promissory estoppel remedy may be
available even where it was not separately raised at trial." The
circuit court, however, did not reach the merits of the promissory
estoppel claim; rather, that claim was remanded to the district court
for further consideration. 9 '
51 Id. at 1296-98.
851 See id. at 1298-1301.
95 Id, at 1298.
'' Id, at 1300.
" Id. at 1300-01.
Be Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 939 F.2d 578, 582 (8th Cir. 1991).
87 Id. at 582 n.5.
" Id. at 582.
ag See id.
" Id. at 583. Here, as in Cohen, the plaintiff failed to plead the promissory estoppel
theory at trial. Id. at 582.
9' Id, at 583.
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Thus, in the context of the two cases discussed above, several
courts have considered and disagreed over the various issues that
arise under the reporter-source confidentiality agreement problem.
These issues are considered more fully in the next two sections.
II. CONTRACT LAW AND THE REPORTER-SOURCE CONFIDENTIALITY
AGREEMENT
Contract law requires that the three basic elements of offer,
acceptance and consideration be present in order to create a binding
agreement. 92 Courts construing reporter-source confidentiality
agreements have found that all three elements exist." The source's
proposal to provide information, conditioned upon confidentiality,
is an offer." The reporter's consent to the condition constitutes an
acceptance." The consideration going to the source is the promise
of confidentiality, while the consideration going to the reporter is
the promise of information." The publication of the source's name
or other information required under the contract to be kept con-
fidential constitutes a breach of that agreement. 97 Although the
elements of a valid contract exist, the agreement may still be held
unenforceable under other contract doctrines, such as vagueness or
lack of intent to contract.
A. The Vague and Ambiguous Nature of the Agreement
Although one can generally find all the elements of a contract
in reporter-source confidentiality agreements, the vague and am-
biguous nature of some such agreements has led one court to decide
not to enforce a reporter-source agreement. 98 In Ruzicka v. Conde
Nast Publications, Inc., the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Minnesota held that the lack of clear • and unambiguous
terms in the agreement prevented the court from enforcing it."
92 See l MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 17, 18, 72 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
95 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen II"), 457 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1990),
rev'd, I I1 S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen mr). The court conceded that "[a] contract, it is
said, consists of an offer, an acceptance, and consideration. Here, we seemingly have all
three, plus a breach .. ."
" Dicke, supra note 3, at 1567 n.77.
95 Id.
" Id.
97 Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 202.
ga Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1300-01 (D. Minn.
1990), modified, 939 F.2d 578, 584 (8th Cir. 1991).
99 Id.
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The case involved a suit by a sexual assault victim against Glamour
magazine, which had interviewed her on the condition that she
would not be "identified or identifiable."'m In considering her
breach of contract claim, the court emphasized that it could not
enforce such an ambiguous agreement because of the uncertainty
that such agreements would cause among reporters and editors
attempting to comply with their terms."" Such enforcement, rea-
soned the court, would chill the exercise of a free press because
news organizations would have to operate under the shadow of
litigation, uncertain what would constitute a breach of the agree-
ment.'"
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
however, indicated that vagueness and ambiguity alone do not con-
stitute reasons for courts to vacate the area entirely.'° 3 The court
reasoned that such difficulties constitute problems of proof only
and do not justify a per se ban on the• enforcement of reporter-
source confidentiality agreements.'" Moreover, the court reasoned
that the facts of Cohen did not present such a difficulty because the
reporters had made a clear promise not to publish Cohen's name. 1 °5
Thus, the Cohen court concluded that the indefiniteness that often
characterizes such agreements cannot serve to invalidate particular
agreements that are themselves clear and definite.'°6
B. Intentions of the Parties
In addition to the question of vagueness, the legal significance
that the parties intend to attach to reporter-source confidentiality
agreements is also an issue for courts considering whether or not
to enforce the agreements.'° 7 In Cohen II, the Minnesota Supreme
Court, although it held that all the elements of a valid contract were
100
	 at 1291.
101 Id. at 1300.
102 Id.
m' Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen II"), 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990), rev'd,
111 S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen Ho.
1°4 Id.
1 °5 Id. See supra note 24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the terms of the
agreement in Cohen.
106 Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 203. The Cohen II court, however, refused to enforce the
agreement on other grounds, reasoning that the parties did not intend to enter a legally
binding agreement. Id, See infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
court's reasoning as to the parties' intentions.
'° Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 203. The court stated that "Nile law • . . does not create a
contract where the parties intended none." Id.
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present, and that the terms were clear, nevertheless concluded that
the parties to the agreement did not intend their actions to be legally
enforceable.'" Rather, the court reasoned, the parties understood
their obligation to be a moral one that, on its own, could not support
a contract.'°9 The court termed the reporter-source exchange a
"special ethical" relationship that should not be subject to the rig-
idity of contract law."° The court, therefore, concluded that each
party to a reporter-source agreement must assume risks and can be
protected only by each other's good faith, not by contract law."'
Though no court has yet applied the objective theory of con-
tracts to the enforcement of reporter-source agreements, the theory
would provide an alternative ground for analysis." 2 The objective
theory recognizes that, generally, there is no requirement that a
party to a contract must intend, or even that he or she must know
of, the legal consequences of his or her actions in entering a con-
tract.'" As long as the person's outward actions indicate an intent
to enter a binding agreement, a court will enforce the contract." 4
A court will enforce a party's subjective intentions only if the other
party knows or should know of the first party's subjective intent." 5
Thus, in deciding whether the parties to reporter-source agree-
ments can be legally bound, both the objective theory of contracts,
as well as the moral obligation reasoning set forth in Cohen II, are
relevant.
C. Promissory Estoppel
Another theory under which courts might analyze the enforce-
ability of reporter-source agreements is that of promissory estop-
E02 Id. The court reasoned that "fwle are not persuaded that in the special milieu of
media newsgathering a source and a reporter ordinarily believe they are engaged in making
a legally binding contract." Id.
109 Id.
Ito Id,
In Id. It should be noted that the Eighth Circuit, in Ruzicka, followed the reasoning of
the Cohen II court in holding that the-reporter-source agreement could not be enforced
under a pure contract theory. Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 939 F.2d 578, 582
(8th Cir. 1991).
"2 E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6 (1st ed. 1982).
" 3 Id. 3.7.
L14 Id. § 3.6.
"5 Id. § 3.7. Knowledge of the first party's subjective intent not to be bound can be
constructive. Courts can find such knowledge in the words that the first party uses or in the
circumstances surrounding the agreement (most often associated with instances where it is
obvious that the person is making the promise for amusement purposes and, thus, obviously
has no intent to be bound). Id.
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pe1. 16 Courts established the doctrine of promissory estoppel to
soften the harsh results of strict contract law in cases where some
requisite contractual element was missing, but where the promisee
had relied, to his or her detriment, on the promise.'" Under section
90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the promisee, or a third
party, must have relied upon the promise, and the promisor must
have reasonably expected such reliance by the promisee or third
party.tt 8 Finally, if the court also finds that injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise, it may enforce the promise
under the promissory estoppel doctrine. 19 In the case of reporter-
source confidentiality agreements, where a source, in good faith,
relies upon the promise of a reporter that he or she will not reveal
the source of the information, a court could enforce such a promise
under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.' 2°
In Cohen II, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided not to apply
the promissory estoppel doctrine to enforce the contract.'" The
court reasoned that, unlike contract theory, where a court neutrally
applies the terms of the agreement without regard for the substance
of the agreement, the decision to enforce an agreement under a
promissory estoppel theory must necessarily take into account the
circumstances and substance of the promise, as well as the circum-
stances surrounding the breach.' 22 The court reasoned that this
taking into account of the actual circumstances and substance of
the promise was necessary given the injustice requirement of Res-
tatement section 90, because such a requirement necessarily requires
courts to look into the agreement and its effects rather than simply
to enforce its terms neutrally.'"
16 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen III"), 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2517-20 (1991);
Cohen II, 457 N,W.2d at 203-05; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS i3 90 (1981).
In relevant part, section 90 states:
(1) A promise which the promisOr should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as
justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
117 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 112, § 2.19.
OH RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
"9 Id.
120 Cohen 11, 457 N.W.2d at 205.
L21 Id .
142 Id. at 204-05.
175 Id,
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Under this reasoning, the court concluded that, given the "dirty
tricks" of both parties to the Cohen agreement, and, because the
protection of Cohen's deniability in this case was not so important
under the injustice requirement of Restatement section 90, it could
not enforce the contract under a promissory estoppel theory. 129
Faced, in other words, with facts indicating unclean hands and
trickery on both sides (Cohen's connection to the Whitney campaign
and his desire to smear Johnson; the newspapers' decision to breach
their agreements), the court concluded that no injustice would result
from its failure to enforce the contract. 125
Finally, the court stated that because it would be forced to look
into the substance of the agreement in this way, a decision to enforce
under promissory estoppel would require the court to abandon
neutral principles and engage in active intervention implicating the
First Amendment.' 26 Analyzing the issue, therefore, under the re-
quirements of the First Amendment, the Cohen II court pointed out
that the case arose in a classic First Amendment context: namely, a
political debate.' 27 The court stated that in some circumstances, a
promissory estoppel remedy may be available to a confidential
source where the state's interest in enforcing the promise outweighs
the First Amendment interests. 128 The court concluded, however,
that in the circumstances of this case, the law should not provide a
remedy and the parties should be left simply to their trust in one
another.' 29 Thus, the court chose not to enforce the agreement
under a promissory estoppel theory.'"
In Cohen III, however, the United States Supreme Court held
that the First Amendment would not bar a promissory estoppel
remedy in the reporter-source agreement context.' 3 ' The Court did
agree with the Minnesota high court that state action was present
because a promissory estoppel theory, in the absence of a normal
contract, involves the active imposition, by the court, of obligations
never explicitly assumed by the parties.' 32 Thus, like the Minnesota
124 Id.
325 Id.
120 See id.
127 Id. at 205.
128 Id.
'" Id.
13° Id.
171 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen III"), 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2518-19 (1991).
"2 Id. at 2518.
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Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court found it neces-
sary to consider the effect of the First Amendment)" The Court
held, however, that the First Amendment would not be violated by
the application of a generally applicable rule of law (promissory
estoppel) to the press.'" Though it could not, of course, decide
whether the state law promissory estoppel remedy should actually
be applied to the case, the Court did hold, contrary to the state
high court, that the First Amendment would not bar such a rem-
edy. 185
The question of whether promissory estoppel can be applied
in the context of a reporter-source confidentiality agreement, then,
has only been fully considered by two courts)" Both agreed that a
court's application of the doctrine would involve active intervention
sufficient to constitute state action implicating the First Amend-
ment.'" The two courts, however, disagreed as to whether the First
Amendment would bar a promissory estoppel remedy.'" On this
matter, of course, the United States Supreme Court has the last
word.
If a court determines that analysis of these contract law issues
demonstrates the existence of a valid, legally enforceable contract
(or, in the case of promissory estoppel, that the Restatement require-
ments are present), the analysis is not complete. The court must
also consider whether the First Amendment applies and, if so,
I " Id.
154 Id.
I" Id, at 2518-19.
138 Id. at 2517-20; Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen II"), 457 N.W.2d 199, 203-05
(Minn. 1990), rev'd, I I 1 S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III"). It should be noted that the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Ruzicka, did state that promissory estoppel may
be available in the reporter-source agreement context. Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications,
Inc., 939 F.2d 578, 582 (8th Cir. 1991). That court, however, did not discuss the merits of
applying the promissory estoppel theory in the reporter-source context because it was bound
by the Supreme Court's holding in Cohen III. See id. at 582-83. Nor did the court reach the
particular applicability of the promissory estoppel theory to the case before it; rather, the
court simply remanded the issue to the district court for further consideration. M. at 583.
In addition, the Supreme Court for Monroe County, New York, in Anderson v. Strong
Memorial Hospital, relied on the Cohen III decision as well in holding that an action to
enforce a promise, made by a reporter and a photographer, was not barred by the First
Amendment. 573 N.Y.S.2d 828, 830 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991). That court, however, did not
distinguish a pure contract theory from a proinissory estoppel theory and held simply that
Cohen dictates that a breach of promise action in the reporter-source context is not barred
by the First Amendment. Id.
1" Cohen III, 111  S. Ct. at 2518; Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 204-05.
"g Cohen III, 111  S. Ct. at 2518-19; Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 204-05.
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whether the First Amendment requires special protection for the
media defendant.'"
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE REPORTER-SOURCE
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT
Courts construing reporter-source confidentiality agreements
must undertake a three-part analysis in deciding whether the First
Amendment provides the media any constitutional protection when
they are being sued by sources for breach of contract.'" The first
requirement is the presence of state action, because the Bill of
Rights only protects citizens against governmental action."' If state
action exists, the court will then need to determine whether the
reporter waived his or her First Amendment rights by entering into
the reporter-source contract. i 92 Finally, if the reporter did not make
such a waiver, the court must balance the need to enforce the
agreement against the burden on the First Amendment that such
enforcement would cause.'"
A. Slate Action
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
hibits Congress from making any laws burdening free speech or
free press.'" The Constitution limits application of this prohibition
to governmental action that in some way restricts speech or the
press, excluding private action that has the same effect.'" Thus, if
the First Amendment is to play any role in an analysis of reporter-
source confidentiality agreements, courts must find some sort of
governmental action restricting speech or the press.'"
The United States Supreme Court first held that a court's en-
forcement of a private agreement may constitute state action in the
139 See, e.g., Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1295 (D. Minn.
1990), modYied, 939 F.2d 578, 584 (8th Cir. 1991).
140 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
"3 Id.
144 U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The First Amendment states, in relevant part, that "Congress
shall make no law
	
. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Id.
' 45 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen I"), 445 N.W.2d 248, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(citing Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952)), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990) ("Cohen II"), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen
III").
16 Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1295.
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1948 case, Shelley v. Kraerner. 147 The petitioners in Shelley, a black
family, had received title to a parcel of land in St. Louis, Missouri.'"
A group of neighbors subsequently brought suit to enforce certain
restrictive covenants on the land that, by their terms, prohibited the
sale of real property to non-Caucasian persons.'" The petitioners
urged, however, that court enforcement of the restrictive covenants
would violate their Fourteenth Amendment rights."'" Though the
agreements were private in nature and would not violate the Con-
stitution if they were voluntarily enforced, the Court reasoned that
any action by a court to enforce the covenants would constitute state
action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' The Court stated that, were it not for the interven-
tion of the state courts in enforcing the covenants, the black peti-
tioners would have been free to occupy the properties. 152 Thus, at
least in the case of racially restrictive covenants sought to be en-
forced against third parties, the Supreme Court has held that ju-
dicial action can amount to state action.'"
In the 1964 case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the United
States Supreme Court considered the state action issue in the con-
text of the First Amendment.'" In New York Times, which involved
a defamation action brought by the Montgomery, Alabama Com-
missioner of Public Affairs, the Court held that the application of
a state rule of law by a court is state action implicating the First
Amendment.' 55 The Commissioner brought suit against the Times,
claiming that an advertisement which appeared in the defendant
newspaper libeled hirri.' 55 The Court summarily decided the issue
of state action by stating that any application, by a court, of a state
rule of law that in some way imposes invalid restrictions on consti-
tutional speech and press freedoms is state action. 157
' 47 334 U.S. I, 20 (1948).
I" Id. at 5.
119 Id. at 4-6.
I" Id. at 7.
I" IS. at 20. The Court stated, "Ilwle hold that in granting judicial enforcement of the
restrictive agreements in these cases, the States have denied petitioners the equal protection
of the laws and that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand." Id.
I " Id. at 19.
I" See id. at 20.
154 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
I" See id. at 265. The Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim that state action was not
involved: "[title test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the
form, whether such power has in fact been exercised." Id.
I" Id. at 256.
167 See id. at 265.
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In addition to its finding of state action, the Supreme Court,
addressing the standard required in defamation cases, concluded
that in order to adequately safeguard First Amendment rights,
public officials who bring defamation suits must show that the de-
fendant acted with "actual malice." 158 The Court reasoned that the
likely chilling effect upon criticism of official conduct caused by the
specter of potential defamation suits would create an impermissible
First Amendment burden.'" Thus, the Court, in the context of
defamation law, extended special protection to speech regarding
public officials by requiring, in addition to a requirement of falsity,
proof that the defendant acted with some sort of knowledge or
recklessness as to the statements' truth. 18°
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has held, in
various situations, that a court's application of neutral and nondis-
criminatory common law does not amount to state action.' 81 For
example, in the 1978 United States Supreme Court case, Flagg Bros.
v. Brooks, the Court held that action by a private party pursuant to
state law was not state action.' 82 In Flagg Bros., New York state law
simply allowed, but did not compel, a creditor to take private action
against the debtor's belongings.'" The case involved a suit brought
by a debtor who claimed that the creditor's threatened sale of her
belongings violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the state law involved
violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment.'" The Court held that the State of New York
could not be held responsible for its mere acquiescence in the
private decision of the creditor to threaten sale of the debtor's
property and that the action, therefore, did not implicate the Four-
teenth Amendment.'"
158 Id. at 279-80. The Court's standard of "actual malice" involves something beyond
mere falsity of the defamatory material and requires proof of knowledge of the falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity. Id.
158
 Id. at 279.
106 Id. at 279-80.
' 6 ' See Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. Inc., v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478,485 (1988); Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,157-63 (1978); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435,446 (1970).
162 436 U.S. 149,157-63 (1978).
163 Id. at 165. The New York law involved was the New York Uniform Commercial
Code section 7-210 which allowed warehousemen to sell the debtor's property. Id. at 151.
161 Id. at 153. The Court stated that 42 U.S.C. 11 1983 requires action "'under color of
any statute' of the [sjtate." Id. at 155. This provision is not at issue in the reporter-source
context, and the reasoning discussed here is, therefore, limited to the court's treatment of
the state action issue.
163 Id. at 165. The Court reasoned that "[tjhis court . . . has never held that a State's
mere acquiescence in a private action converts that action into that of the State." Id. at 164.
May 1992]	 REPORTER CONFIDENTIALITY	 619
Similarly, in the 1970 case, Evans v. Abney, the United States
Supreme Court held that a state court's application of neutral and
nondiscriminatory state trust laws does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.'" In Evans, a former United States senator conveyed
a tract of land in trust to the city of Macon, Georgia, for the creation
of a park for the exclusive use of white people.' 67 Because an earlier
decision of the Court in Evans v. Newton had held that the park
could not continue to be operated in a racially discriminatory way,'"
the Georgia Supreme Court held that the trust terms could not be
fulfilled and that the property, therefore, reverted to the heirs of
the senator.'" The United States Supreme Court decided that,
because this action was a neutral application of trust law, in that it
deprived both whites and non-whites of the use of the property, it
did not violate the Constitution.'"
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. (Cohen I), the suit to enforce the
private confidentiality agreement presented the state action issue to
the Minnesota Court of Appeals.'" That court stated that the Flagg
Bros. and Evans decisions stood for the proposition that the neutral
application of state laws does not amount to state action.' 72 Citing
Shelley v. Kraemer, however, the court also acknowledged that court
action can be state action where the court is engaged in "active
intervention." 175
In deciding between the two conflicting rationales, the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals reasoned that the enforcement of the re-
porter-source agreement was not active intervention similar to that
in Shelley, but rather, it was the application of neutral contract law. 174
The Cohen I court reasoned that the court's enforcement of the
agreement would simply involve the neutral enforcement of a prior
agreement at the request of one of the parties to the agreement.' 75
Conversely, according to the court, Shelley involved positive action
166 396 U.S. 435, 446 (1970).
1" Id. at 436.
IC° 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966).
169 See Evans, 396 U.S. at 436. The Georgia Supreme Court decision is reported at 165
S.E.2d 160, 166 (Ga. 1968).
17° Evans, 396 U.S. at 446.
171 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen I"), 445 N.W.2d 248, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989),
aff'd in part, rev'd in pare, 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990) ("Cohen II"), rev'd, 111 S. Ct.
2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen II").
172 Id. at 254-55.
1 " Id. at 255.
"4 Id.
173
 Id.
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by the courts at the request of third parties against persons who
were not party to the agreement. 16 The court, therefore, decided
that the Flagg Bros.lEvans neutral application rationale most closely
resembled the reporter-source problem and that the enforcement
of the agreement did not constitute state action."'
Further, the Minnesota appeals court acknowledged the New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan holding that the application of state def-
amation law to a newspaper constitutes state action.'" In distin-
guishing New York Times from reporter-source agreement cases, the
appeals court noted that important differences exist between def-
amation and contract law."9 The Cohen I court reasoned that the
rules of contract are neutral as to speech because they do not require
the suppression of any particular words.'" Rather, the rules of
contract would be applied in this context to suppress those words
that the parties have already agreed to keep confidential. 18 ' Thus,
reasoned the court, contract law is directed not at the words them-
selves, but at one party's failure to honor his or her promise.' 82 The
Cohen I court concluded, therefore, that because contract law, unlike
defamation law, is neutral as to speech, the application of contract
law to the reporter-source problem is not state action.'"
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the appeals court's
analysis and held that the court's action was state action. 184 Initially,
the state supreme court acknowledged the appeals court's applica-
tion of the "neutral principles" analysis to cases involving enforce-
ment under a contract theory. 186 The state supreme court, however,
declined to enforce the agreement under traditional contract law
because it concluded that the parties had not intended to attach
legal significance to the agreement.' 86 The Cohen II court then ex-
plored the possibility of enforcement under a promissory estoppel
' 76 Id.
177 Id.
I" Id, at 255-56.
19 Id, at 256.
18D Id.
" 1 Id.
'S'
' 83
 Id.
I" See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen II"), 457 N.W.2d 199, 204-05 (Minn. 1990),
rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III").
'9s
	 at 204.
185 Id. at 203. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
court's reasoning as to the parties' intentions.
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theory.' 87 The court concluded that the "neutral principles" analysis
was not applicable in a promissory estoppel context because of the
injustice requirement of the Restatement's promissory estoppel pro-
vision.'" In other words, because the court, under a promissory
estoppel analysis, must consider the substantive circumstances and
facts surrounding the agreement and its breach, it could no longer
apply neutral principles of contract law.' 89 The court, therefore,
concluded that the proposed enforcement, by the court, of the
confidentiality agreement rose beyond the level of neutral applica-
tion to the level of state action. 19°
The United States Supreme Court, in Cohen III, agreed that
the application, by a court, of a promissory estoppel remedy in-
volved active intervention sufficient to constitute state action. 19 ' The
Court's reasoning, somewhat different from that of the Cohen II
court, noted that promissory estoppel involves the imposition, by
the court, of legal obligations that were never explicitly assumed by
the parties to the agreement. 192 Like the Cohen II court, however,
the United States Supreme Court in Cohen III concluded that such
active application, by a court, of the state law doctrine of promissory
estoppel would constitute state action implicating the First Amend-
ment.'" It should be noted, however, that the Court considered
only the promissory estoppel remedy and did not address whether
enforcement of the agreement under normal contract law would
constitute state action.'"
In its consideration of the state action question, the federal
district court in Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc. did not men-
tion the neutral principles analysis.' 95 Rather, the court concluded
that no meaningful difference existed between the defamation ac-
tion in New York Times and the reporter-source contract action.' 96
The court reasoned that any differences that exist between tort and
132 Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 203. See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the court's reasoning as to promissory estoppel.
' 9° Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 205.
' 89 Id.
199 Id.
'°' Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen III"), 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991).
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 See id. at 2516.
' 93 733 F. Supp. 1289,1295-96 (D. Minn. 1990), modified, 939 F.2d 578,584 (8th Cir.
1991).
196 Id. at 1295.
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contract law are not significant enough to justify variant treat-
ment.'97
 The district court in Ruzicka thus concluded that state
action existed in the court's enforcement of the promise.' 98
In sum, in the context of the reporter-source confidentiality
agreement, courts have taken three distinct positions on the state
action issue. The Ruzicka court found the New York Times rationale
most convincing and concluded that no important differences exist
between tort and contract law for state action purposes.' 99 The
Cohen II and Cohen III courts, considering enforcement under a
promissory estoppel theory, concluded that no neutral application
of law could arise under promissory estoppel and that there was,
therefore, state action. 20° Finally, the Cohen I court reasoned that
the neutral principles logic of Evans and Flagg Bros. was most ap-
plicable in this context and concluded that there was no state ac-
tion. 20 '
B. Waiver
If state action is present in the enforcement of a reporter-
source confidentiality agreement, the First Amendment may still
not apply if the reporter, by entering the agreement, has, waived
his or her constitutional rights. 202
 In addressing the standard for
waiver of First Amendment rights, the United States Supreme
Court has held that in order to be effective, such a waiver must be
"clear and compelling." 203
With regard to contractual waiver of First Amendment rights,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held, in
the 1988 case of Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, that
constitutional rights may be contractually waived under certain cir-
197 Id. One commentator has agreed with this analysis, stating summarily that "state
action occurs through judicial enforcement of the rights of the parties." Dicke, supra note 3,
at 1574 n.118.
IBB Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1296.
199 Id. at 1295.
29°
 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen lir), 111  S. Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991); Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen In, 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2513,
2520 (1991).
2°I
 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen n, 445 N.W.2d 248, 255-57 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990) ("Cohen II"), rev'd, 111
S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III").
202 Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1296-98.
2°3
 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967) (defamation defendant's
failure to raise a constitutional defense before trial did not constitute a waiver of that defense
in circumstances that fell short of being clear and compelling).
May 1992]	 REPORTER CONFIDENTIALITY 	 623
cumstances. 204 Erie Telecommunications involved a cable operator
which clainied that its agreements with the city of Erie, Pennsylvania
violated its First Amendment rights. 205 The operator asserted that
the agreements imposed a money and content-based prior restraint
upon the cable operator and that they singled out the operator in
a discriminatory manner.206
The Court of Appeals in Erie Telecommunications discussed the
United States Supreme Court's standard for contractual waiver of
constitutional rights. 2°7 The Erie Telecommunications court concluded
that, applying the Supreme Court standard for waiver to the cable
operator's situation, a contractual waiver of rights is effective only
where the waiving party clearly acts voluntarily and with a full
understanding of the consequences of the waiver. 208 The Erie Tele-
communications court noted that under the United States Supreme
Court cases, such volition and understanding exist where the parties
have equal bargaining power, where the terms of the contract are
freely negotiated, where the waiving party has the advice of counsel,
and where the waiving party has engaged in other contract nego-
tiations in the past.209 The court considered each of these factors
important in holding that the cable operator had executed a valid
waiver of its constitutional rights. 210
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. (Cohen I), the Court of Appeals of
Minnesota, after reviewing the Erie Telecommunications standard, re-
affirmed and approved the standard concluding that the reporters
had, in fact, waived their First Amendment rights upon entering
the contract with Cohen. 2 " The court specifically noted that both
reporters were veterans who had entered many such agreements in
the past. 212 Further, the court noted that both reporters knew of
Cohen's status as a public figure and therefore knew that they were
"4 853 F.2d 1084, 1094 (3d Cir. 1988).
2°6 Id, at 1085.
2°6 Id.
2°2 Id..at 1094-96. In its discussion of the United States Supreme Court's waiver stan-
dard, the Erie Telecommunications court focused on two 1972 cases, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972), and D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972). Erie Telecommu-
nications, 853 F.2d at 1095-96.
2°6 Erie Telecommunications, 853 F.2d at 1096.
"9 Id.
210 See id. at 1096-97.
211 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen 1"), 445 N.W.2d 248, 258 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990) ("Cohen In, rev'd, 111 S. Ct.
2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III").
212 Id.
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waiving the right to publish a name of public interest. 2 " Finally, the
court considered it significant that the waiver was not extracted by
the state as in the case of a criminal defendant pleading guilty to a
crime or waiving his or her right to a jury trial.214
 Rather, the court
reasoned, both parties to these agreements were experienced and
on an equal footing, and the reporters, therefore, need not have
been afforded as much protection as a criminal defendant. 215
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota,
in Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., decided that the magazine
had not waived its constitutional rights. 216
 Because the facts in Ru-
zicka did not present the kind of clear contractual terms that Cohen
presented, the court held that the waiver did not meet the Erie
Telecommunications standard.217 Specifically, the court reasoned that
the waiver was not voluntary and knowing because the terms of the
agreement, requiring that the plaintiff not be identified or made
identifiable, were not sufficiently specific to apprise the reporter of
what information could not be published.218 Thus, to constitute a
valid contractual waiver, a reporter-source• confidentiality agree-
ment must be clear about what may permissibly be published in
order to ensure that the reporter has full knowledge of the conse-
quences of the waiver. 219
In sum, in order to make a valid waiver of First Amendment
rights in the reporter-source agreement context, the reporter must
be waiving his or her rights voluntarily and with a clear understand-
ing of the consequences of the waiver.220 Moreover, in attempting
to determine whether a reporter has made such a voluntary and
knowing waiver, a court will look to the circumstances of the waiver,
including the parties' sophistication, relative bargaining strength
and access to legal counse1. 22 '
2I Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 733 F. Supp. 1289,1298 (D. Minn. 1990), modified, 939 F.2d 578,584 (8th Cir. 1991).
2" Id. at 1296-98.
218 Id. at 1298. The court reasoned that a "reporter, for the most part, cannot know
what information will threaten the anonymity of a source, unless the source specifies what
facts should not be published." Id.
19 Id.
220 Id. at 1297.
221 Id.
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C. First Amendment Rights Balanced Against the Interests in
Enforcement of the Contract
If a court cannot find a valid waiver in the terms of the agree-
ment, the First Amendment does not require automatic voidance
of a contract that is found to burden speech or the press. 222 The
United States Supreme Court has established a balancing test to
determine whether the state action involved impermissibly burdens
the First Amendment. 228 Specifically, the Court has stated, in the
1983 case of Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner
of Revenue, that it will not uphold a burden upon the First Amend-
ment unless its proponents can show an overriding governmental
interest in support of the state action. 224 The Minneapolis Star case
involved the state's enactment of a special use tax upon the cost of
paper and ink products consumed in the production of newspa-
pers.225 The Supreme Court, noting that a tax that singles out the
press places a heavy burden on the state to show adequate justifi-
cation for its actions, concluded that Minnesota had shown no such
justification. 226 Though the First Amendment interests outweighed
the state interests in Minneapolis Star, the Court, nonetheless, rec-
ognized that First Amendment rights are not absolute and may be
burdened to some extent where the state can show an overriding
governmental interest. 227
Similarly, in terms of the reporter-source agreement problem,
the district court in Ruzicka stated that it is necessary to examine
the interests protected by the First Amendment and weigh them
against the need to enforce the agreement. 228 For this reason, the
222 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen 1"), 445 N.W.2d 248, 256 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990) ("Cohen II"), rev'd, 111  S. Ct.
2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III").
223 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 680-81 (1972); see also Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582 (1983).
223 Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 582.
223 Id. at 577.
226 Id. at 592-93.
227 See id. at 582, 585. The Court stated that "[d]ifferential taxation of the press, then,
places such a burden on the interests protected by the First Amendment that we cannot
countenance such treatment unless the State asserts a counterbalancing interest of compelling
importance that it cannot achieve without differential taxation." Id. at 585.
228 Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1298 (D. Minn. 1990),
modified, 939 F.2d 578, 584 (8th Cir. 1991). The district court in Ruzicka stated that
Irlesolution of this question requires a balancing of the interests underlying the state law of
contracts and the interests protected by the free speech and press clauses of the iflirst
iAlmendment." Id.
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Ruzicka court attempted a balancing test like that which the United
States Supreme Court has employed in other contexts. 229
1. The Need to Enforce the Agreement
The Minnesota appeals court in Cohen I discussed cases in which
courts have considered contractual rights to be generally compel-
ling, and even sufficient to outweigh First Amendment considera-
tions. 23° For example, in the 1980 United States Supreme Court
case, Snepp v. United States, the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA")
sued a former agent who had published a book about his experi-
ences without obtaining the Agency's specific prior approval."'
Such approval was required under Snepp's employment agreement
with the CIA.232
 The Court held that the agent had breached the
agreement, and the Court imposed a constructive trust, benefiting
the government, on all of the book's profits attributable to the
breach.233
 In so holding, the Court reversed the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals' opinion which had held that Snepp had a First
Amendment right to publish unclassified information. 234
 The
United States Supreme Court rejected the First Amendment argu-
ment and held that the terms of the agreement explicitly prohibited
publication of any information related to the agent's experience with
the CIA, absent pre-publication review and clearance. 235 Thus, the
Court implicitly held that the contractual obligation took priority
over First Amendment considerations. 236
In cases involving reporter-source confidentiality agreements,
claimants have offered various rationales demonstrating the impor-
tance of enforcing such agreements. 237 Plaintiffs have argued that
229 Id. at 1298-1301.
23° Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen r.), 445 N.W.2d 248, 257 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(citing Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 511 (1980); Duluth Lumber & Plywood Co. v.
Delta Dev., Inc., 281 N.W.2d 377, 381-83 (Minn. 1979)), aff'd in part, rev'd in pare, 457
N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990) ("Cohen 11"), rev'd, III S. CL 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III").
2" 444 U.S. at 507-08.
2" Id.
2" Id. at 515-16.
294 Id. at 509-10.
2)5
	 at 508-13.
256 See id. at 510-13.
2" See, e.g., Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1299 (D. Minn.
1990), modified, 939 F.2d 578, 584 (8th Cir. 1991); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen II"),
457 N.W.2d 199, 205-07 (Minn. 1990) (Yetka, J., dissenting), rev'd, 111  S. Ct. 2513, 2520
(1991) ("Cohen III"); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen I"), 445 N.W.2d 248, 256-58 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990) ("Cohen II"),
rev'd, 1 l l S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III" ).
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news sources, if unable to enforce such agreements, would be re-
luctant to give information, thereby depriving the public of impor-
tant news.238 In addition, such a breach can cause serious harm to
the source's reputation, livelihood and even personal safety. 239 in
addition, one commentator has noted that such breaches by re-
porters are occurring more frequently, creating an increasingly
problematic situation for news sources. 24°
Finally, one commentator has pointed out that non-enforce-
ment of these agreements would seriously weaken the rationale for
extending to reporters any type of privilege that would protect them
from being compelled to disclose their sources."' The dissent in Cohen
II reasoned that it is inconsistent to shield the press from compul-
sory disclosure in some cases and to allow disclosure . with impunity
in others. 242 The United States Supreme Court has held that the
First Amendment does not exempt reporters from compulsory dis-
closure in the context of a grand jury investigation. 243 Many courts,
however, have upheld a conditional privilege for reporters in certain
cases. 244 Further, many states have enacted so-called "shield laws"
that, in varying degrees, extend protection to reporter-source con-
fidentiality. 245 Thus, the dissent in Cohen II concluded that it would
be inconsistent to allow reporters to invoke the reporter-source
privilege where they do not wish to reveal a source and to allow
them to disregard the reporter-source confidentiality agreement
where it is in their interest to reveal the source. 246
Thus, several important interests exist in enforcing reporter-
source confidentiality agreements. 247 Indeed, the governmental in-
232 See Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 206 (Yetka, J., dissenting); Cohen 1, 445 N.W.2d at 257.
Contra Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1299.
239 Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1299.
249 Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Broken Promises, 27 CoLum, JOURNALISM REV. 21, 21-
22 ( July—Aug. 1988).
2" Id, at 24.
242 Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 206 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
243 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972) (Court required that the reporter
testify pursuant to a grand jury subpoena, notwithstanding the reporter's First Amendment
rights).
244 See Dicke, supra note 3, at 1565-66 (citing Zelenka v. State, 266 N.W.2d 279, 287
(Wis. 1978); I'aul Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege: An Analysis of the Common Law, Branzburg
v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARIZ. L. REV, 815, 850-51 (1983)).
2" See Dicke, supra note 3, at 1566 n.72.
"6 Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 206 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
247 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen I"), 445 N.W.2d 248, 256-57 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in pan, 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990) ("Cohen II"), rev'd, 111
S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III").
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terest in enforcing contractual rights has been considered, in an-
other context, to outweigh First Amendment considerations. 248
Moreover, in the context of reporter-source_ agreements, litigants
have offered several reasons to enforce such agreements, including
protecting sources from injury and avoiding inconsistent logic re-
garding the sanctity of the reporter-source relationship. 249
2. Burden on the First Amendment
The primary burden on the First Amendment that courts must
balance against the interests in enforcement is the possibility that
such agreements usurp the editorial process. 25° Both the district
court in Ruzicka and the dissent in Cohen I pointed out that enforce-
ment of the agreement would take decisions as to news content out
of the hands of the editor, thus chilling the exercise of a free
press.25 ' The Ruzicka court likened this chilling effect to that feared
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, a defamation case. 252 The Ruzicka
court explained that in both the reporter-source agreement and
defamation contexts, a burden on the editorial process can result
from a news organization's reluctance to risk protracted litigation
and large damage awards. 253
In addition, the district court in Ruzicka also concluded that
because reporter-source agreements are often vague and ambigu-
ous, they create an undue burden on the First Amendment. 254 This
ambiguity causes the news organization to be uncertain as to what
it may permissibly include in a story. 255 This uncertainty, one com-
mentator has argued, can inhibit the editorial decision-making pro-
cess by causing editors not to publish. 256
 Should the newspaper
decide, nonetheless, to print the item of news, court enforcement
245
 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507,510-13 (1980).
24°
 See Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 205-06 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
22° See Dicke, supra note 3, at 1569. The article notes that confidentiality agreements
"restrain the editorial freedom of media entities to publish what they have learned, by Limiting
their discretion to disclose either the identity of sources or the information given to reporters
on condition it not be published." Id.
2°' Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289,1299-1300 (D. Minn.
1990), modified, 939 F.2d 578,584 (8th Cir. 1991); Cohen 1, 445 N.W.2d at 263 (Crippen, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
222 Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1299-1300; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254,277 (1964); Dicke, supra note 3, at 1576.
212 Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1299-1300.
211 Id. at 1300-01; see also, Dicke, supra note 3, at 1570-71.
215
 Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1300.
256 Dicke, supra note 3, at 1570-71.
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of the agreement could lead to problems of proof and protracted
litigation. 257 Thus, in addition to raising problems of contract law,258
vagueness can also burden the First Amendment by inhibiting the
editorial process.
Finally, Minnesota appeals court Judge Gary Crippen, who
wrote the dissent in the Cohen I decision, addressed a problem that
is at the heart of the First Amendment itself. 259 Judge Crippen
argued that First Amendment rights are not solely those of the
party seeking to publish or speak. 28° He reasoned that because these
rights are those of the public, the newspaper or reporter alone
cannot properly waive them. 261 Judge Crippen concluded, there-
fore, that the appeals court had erred in holding that the reporters
had made a valid contractual waiver, because such a waiver would
burden the public's First Amendment right to have access to infor-
ma tion. 262
These arguments, then, are the principal ones urging that re-
porter-source confidentiality agreements burden the First Amend-
ment. The primary objection to such agreements lies in the assertion
that they inhibit the free discretion of news organizations and, as
such, are inconsistent with the First Amendment. 28s Moreover,
newspapers have argued that the informal and vague nature of the
reporter-source agreement places an undue burden on the First
Amendment. 284 Finally, as Judge Crippen noted, the First Amend-
ment may be impermissibly burdened in this context simply because
the public's rights, as guaranteed under the First Amendment, are
not properly protected by allowing one person to waive them. 285
IV. THE CASE FOR ENFORCEMENT
The enforcement of reporter-source confidentiality agreements
initially appears to involve an unavoidable clash between contract
"' Id,
"6 See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the contract law
aspects of the vagueness issue.
259 Cohen v, Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen 1"), 445 N.W.2d 248, 268 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(Crippen, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d
199, 200 (Minn. 1990) ("Cohen II"), rev'd, I 1 1 S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III").
269 Id. at 267-68 (Crippen, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
26 ' Id. at 267 (Crippen, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
262 Id. at 267-68 (Crippen, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
265 See Dicke, supra note 3, at 1569.
264 See Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1300 (D. Minn.
1990), modified, 939 F.2d 578, 584 (8th Cir. 1991).
265 Cohen 1, 445 N.W.2d at 267-68 (Crippen, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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law and First Amendment protections. Upon closer scrutiny, how-
ever, it becomes apparent that courts can compensate injured news
sources without damaging the delicate fabric of the First Amend-
ment. Such scrutiny should begin with an inquiry into whether the
First Amendment ought to be applied at all in the context of re-
porter-source confidentiality agreements.
A. First Amendment Not Applicable
The First Amendment should not be applied to prevent en-
forcement of reporter-source confidentiality agreements. First, be-
cause no state action is involved in court enforcement of a privately
negotiated agreement, the constitutional limitations do not apply. 266
Second, given a properly structured confidentiality agreement, the
reporter involved has effectively waived any First Amendment
rights.267
The important question for purposes of the, state action issue
is whether the enforcement of reporter-source agreements like that
in Cohen should be treated as state action under Shelley and New
York Times, or as the neutral application of state law under Flagg
Bros. and Evans. 268 The Shelley factual situation is both unique and
easily distinguishable from the circumstances surrounding reporter-
source confidentiality agreements. 269 Shelley involved court enforce-
ment of racially discriminatory covenants prohibiting the sale of
real property to non-Caucasians—particularly offensive agreements
that could never be enforced in a socially useful and beneficial
manner.27° Confidentiality agreements, however, serve several use-
ful purposes, including the enhancement of the reporter's ability to
gather information that is of interest to the public, and the protec-
tion of the source's reputation, livelihood and personal safety."'
Thus, though some might argue that confidentiality agreements
226 See supra notes 144-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of state action in
the context of the reporter-source confidentiality agreement.
267 See supra notes 202-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of waiver of consti-
tutional righti.
222 See supra notes 147-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the United States
Supreme Court's handling of the state action issue in these cases.
262 Shelley v. Kraemer, 339 U.S. 1,4-8 (1948). See supra notes 147-53 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Shelley case.
272 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 4-5.
271 See supra notes 237-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various
rationales that courts and commentators have offered to demonstrate the usefulness of
reporter-source confidentiality agreements.
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have some unattractive aspects, such agreements do not present the
inherently repugnant obligations of the racially restrictive covenants
in Shelley.
Further, the neighbors in Shelley were attempting to enforce
the restrictive covenants against persons who were not parties to
the original agreement. 272 Had the Court chosen to enforce the
covenant and prevent the minority petitioners from taking title to
the property, such action would rise beyond disinterested enforce-
ment of a private agreement to the level of discriminatory state
action against nonconsenting parties. 273 Persons suing for breach of
reporter-source agreements, on the other hand, seek only to enforce
the agreement against a reporter or news organization that was a
party to, and that consented to, the agreement. Thus, unlike the
black home buyers in Shelley, the reporter or news organization is
able to negotiate the terms of the agreement and can choose not to
enter it if the negotiations are unsatisfactory.
The fact that the home buyers in Shelley were not parties to the
underlying agreements implicates the "neutral principles" rationale
discussed by the appeals court in Cohen 1.274 Unlike the Court in
Shelley, a court engaged in the enforcement of a confidentiality
agreement is simply applying nondiscriminatory and neutral rules
of contract law to support the agreement reached by the parties to
the contract who are now both before the court. As the appeals
court in Cohen 1 concluded, such action is not "active intervention"
on the part of the state because it simply enforces the prior agree-
ment reached by the litigants. 275 Though the neighbors in the Shelley
case were asking the court to take an active role and enforce the
covenants against third parties, the source in a reporter-source
contract action is merely asking the court to apply the neutral rules
of contract to reaffirm the previous agreement of the parties.
It is important to note, as well, that the Minnesota Supreme
Court decision in Cohen 11 implicitly endorsed the "neutral princi-
ples" rationale with regard to a pure contract theory. 276 The Cohen
272 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 1 .
273 Id. at 19.
274 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen 1"), 445 N.W.2d 248, 254-55 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989), aff 'd in part, rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990) ("Cohen II"), rev'd, 111
S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III"). See supra notes 101-201 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the neutral principles rationale.
273 Cohen 1, 445 N.W.2d at 255.
276 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen In, 457 N.W.2d 199, 204-05 (Minn. 1990),
rev'd, III S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III"). The Cohen II court reasoned that:
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II court rejected the contract claim, holding that the parties had no
intention of creating a legally binding agreement."' The court,
therefore, then analyzed the promise under a promissory estoppel
theory, and concluded that the neutral principles logic could not be
used in the context of promissory estoppel. 278 Because the neutral
principles rationale was not applicable, the court found it necessary
to consider the First Amendment. 279 Thus, if the court had accepted
the contract cause of action, it presumably would have held that the
neutral principles rationale applied and that it was not necessary to
consider the First Amendment.
A similar observation can be made with respect to the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Cohen III. There, the Court
reasoned that the application of a promissory estoppel theory would
involve state action because it would require the Court to impose
obligations never explicitly agreed to by the parties. 28° By contrast,
this reasoning does not apply where the parties have in fact agreed
to keep certain information confidential and where the claim being
considered is a pure contract claim rather than promissory estoppel.
Thus, both the Cohen II and Cohen III courts' rationales with respect
to the state action issue do not apply under a pure contract theory
of enforcement.
Further, because important distinctions exist between tort and
contract law, courts should not apply the rationale of the New York
Times decision to find state action in the case of confidentiality
agreements. 281 The New York Times Court held that the application
the court of appeals, using a contract approach, concluded.that applying 'neutral
principles' of contract law either did not trigger First Amendment scrutiny or,
if it did, the state's interest in freedom of contract outweighed any constitutional
free press rights .... Under a promissory estoppel analysis there can be no
neutrality towards the First Amendment.
Id. Thus, the Minnesota high court did not reject the neutral principles logic as the appeals
court had used it, but held only that it could not be used in the promissory estoppel context.
Id.
2" Id. at 203. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Minnesota Supreme Court's reasoning with regard to the parties' intentions.
278 Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 203-05.
778 Id. at 204-05. See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Minnesota Supreme Court's reasoning as to promissory estoppel and the First Amendment.
788 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen III"), 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991). See supra
notes 191-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Cohen III Court's reasoning as
to state action in the promissory estoppel context.
281 See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differences
between the tort law of defamation of the New York Times case and the contract law of the
Cohen case.
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of state defamation law by a court amounts to state action. 282 The
district court in Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., which con-
cluded that New York Times was applicable, stated, in summary fash-
ion, that no important differences existed between tort and contract
law and, therefore, that court enforcement of a reporter-source
agreement was state action.288
The consensual nature of the contract, however, presents an
important distinction from the law of torts that should be dispositive
of the state action issue. The fact that a reporter has the ability to
negotiate the terms of a confidentiality agreement allows him or her
freely to choose the circumstances under which he or she will be
subject to action by the courts. The defamation defendant, on the
other hand, is confronted directly with the power of the state in the
form of predetermined rules of tort liability. Where the rules of
contract, then, represent mere mechanisms for the realization of
private intentions, the rules of tort represent the public intentions
of the state. A court's enforcement of a private reporter-source
agreement under a pure contract theory, therefore, is not state
action that would implicate the First Amendment.
Unlike Shelley and New York Times, the Flagg Bros. and Evans
cases stand for the proposition that the mere neutral application of
state law does not amount to state action. 284 The reporter-source
problem, because it involves such a neutral application of contract
law, is analogous to the Flagg Bros. and Evans cases. 288 Once again,
the private and consensual nature of contract law involves no im-
position of the state's will upon either party. Rather, it involves only
the enforcement of the parties' own will as expressed in the original
agreement. The after-the-fact action by the court in applying neu-
tral principles of contract law is very much like the application of
state trust law in Evans because it simply uses the rules of contract
to enforce the will of the parties. 286 Indeed, Evans may have involved
an even more active court than in the reporter-source context be-
282 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
285 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1295 (D. Minn. 1990), modified, 939 F.2d 578, 584 (8th Cir. 1991).
The court said little more than "[t]he differences between tort and contract law do not justify
a different result in this case." 1d.
285 See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Flagg Bros.
and Evans cases.
285 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen I"), 445 N.W.2d 248, 255 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990) ("Cohen II"), rev'd, 111 S. Ct.
2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III").
286 Id.
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cause the Evans Court imposed a remedy not provided for in the
agreement. 287
Careful scrutiny of the precedent in the state action area, then,
reveals important differences between Shelley and New York Times,
on the one hand, and the reporter-source confidentiality agreement
on the other. In the end, the fundamental difference between them
is the consensual nature of the reporter-source agreement, which
affords both parties the opportunity to negotiate and exercise
choice. Because this choice is available, the subsequent court en-
forcement should be viewed not as state action sufficient to implicate
the Constitution, but simply as a mechanism for the realization of
consensual private intentions.
Analysis of the waiver issue also reveals that the First Amend-
ment does not apply to the enforcement of reporter-source agree-
ments. Assuming that the court pays close attention to normal rules
of contract law that require clear and definite terms in order to
enforce an agreement, it is possible for a reporter to execute a valid
waiver of his or her First Amendment rights. 288 An analysis of the
case law on reporter-source confidentiality agreements reveals that,
unlike other issues in the area of reporter-source confidentiality
agreements, very little disagreement exists, among the courts that
have considered such agreements, over the proper standard to
apply regarding waiver. 289
Courts considering reporter-source confidentiality agreements
have applied the standard for waiver enunciated in Erie Telecom-
munications, Inc. v. City of Erie. 29° The appeals court in Cohen I found
a valid waiver while the district court in Ruzicka did not. 29 ' That the
courts differed on the waiver issue can be attributed to the vague-
ness and ambiguity of the agreement involved in Ruzicka, which did
not allow the reporter involved to exercise a knowing and voluntary
2"' Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 444 (1970). The Court, applying trust law, terminated
the trust and held that the property reverted to the late senator's estate.
288 See supra notes 202-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of waiver.
289 See supra notes 211-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standard for
waiver that has been applied to reporter-source agreements.
29°
 853 F.2d 1084, 1096 (3d Cir. 1988). See supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Erie Telecommunications waiver standard.
29I Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1298 (D. Minn. 1990),
modified, 939 F.2d 578, 584 (8th Cir. 1991); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen I"), 445
N.W.2d 248, 258 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd in part, reild in part, 457 N.W.2d 199, 200
(Minn. 1990) ("Cohen II"), reed, 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III"). See supra notes
211-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Cohen I and the Ruzicka courts' waiver
reasoning.
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waiver. 292 Thus, the Ruzicka court may possibly have found a valid
waiver given an agreement with clear terms like that in Cohen. 293
Neither the Minnesota Supreme Court in Cohen II nor the United
States Supreme Court in Cohen III addressed the question of con-
tractual waiver at all. 294
Therefore, little disagreement has arisen, among those few
courts that have considered reporter-source agreements, with re-
gard to the waiver issue. Where the source can show that the Erie
Telecommunications standard is met, that is, that the reporter has
entered the agreement voluntarily and with a full understanding of
the consequences, the reporter has validly waived his or her First
Amendment rights.
Thus, because no state action is involved in the enforcement of
reporter-source confidentiality agreements, and moreover, because
the reporter can make a valid waiver of constitutional rights, the
First Amendment should not prevent courts from enforcing these
agreements. Even if the First Amendment interests are considered,
however, courts must also consider the competing interests in en-
forcing the agreement and must balance the two. 295
B. The Balancing Test
A balancing of the need to enforce reporter-source confiden-
tiality agreements against the burden on the First Amendment
caused by such enforcement demonstrates the preeminence of the
interests favoring enforcement. First, the First Amendment consid-
erations are not as problematic as they might first appear, because
one can view the making of these agreements as part of the editorial
decision-making process rather than as a burden on that process. 296
Second, given a clear and unambiguous agreement that, if
292 Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1298. See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the particular facts in Ruzicka that precluded the magazine from making an
effective waiver.
293 See Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1298. The court reasoned, "[i]n Cohen, the terms of the
purported waiver seem clear . . • . [A]t least under the circumstances here, the agreement
must specify the information which is not to be published in order for the waiver to be
effective." Id.
294 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen In, 457 N.W.2d 199, 199 (Minn. 1990),
reild, 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III").
"' See supra notes 222-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of how courts have
defined and applied the balancing test.
296 See infra notes 298-309 and accompanying text for a discussion of the minimal
nature of the First Amendment burden.
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breached, exposes the source to some form of harm, the interests
in favor of enforcement are great. 297
I. Minimal Burden on the First Amendment
The first rationale advanced to show that confidentiality agree-
ments burden First Amendment rights is that such agreements
burden the editorial decision-making process. 298 Upon close scru-
tiny, this argument is unconvincing because it creates an artificial
distinction between confidentiality agreements and other kinds of
editorial decisions. From a business standpoint, one of the primary
resources of any news organization is information. Every day, news
organizations make editorial decisions on how to obtain, process,
analyze and present this resource. Thus, the media must decide
whether to send reporters to cover a story, how best to assemble
the information gathered by the reporter, whether to present that
information to the public, and finally, how best to present that
information. The decision on what news the public ultimately re-
ceives is based upon many things, including priorities as to what
stories are most important, practical limitations such as how much
space or time is available for another story, and business consider-
ations regarding what will sell the most newspapers or attract the
most listeners or viewers.
In this context, every news organization, through its reporters,
must at times make sacrifices or promises as payment for valuable
information. The choice to make such promises is a business deci-
sion involving calculated risks that the news organization hopes will
yield a profitable return. Thus, entering a confidentiality agreement
is really an extension of, rather than a restriction on, the editorial
process. The choice, therefore, to promise not to publish some
information, in order to obtain other information, is equivalent to
the decision not to publish something simply because the editor
thinks it is not newsworthy. In either case, the news entity, through
its reporters or editors, has made a conscious business choice.
Moreover, this notion of choice echoes the idea that contracts
are unique because of their consensual nature. 299 Because reporter-
"7 See infra notes 310-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the compelling
nature of the interests favoring enforcement.
298 See supra notes 250-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of how reporter-
source agreements have been seen as burdening the editorial decision-making process.
'gg See supra notes 281-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the consensual
nature of the contract and its effect upon the state action question.
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source agreements are consensual and because news organizations
can choose not to be bound, such agreements do not hinder the
editorial process. A court's subsequent neutral enforcement of the
predetermined terms of agreement does not create any unforeseen
obligations for either party."' Thus, the editor's freedom of choice
is left intact.
Similarly, the argument that a news entity's uncertainty as to
the terms of the agreement can cause an impermissible First
Amendment burden is also unpersuasive upon close scrutiny."' As
noted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Cohen II, the problem of
the indefiniteness or ambiguity of a particular agreement does not
indicate a need for per se unenforceability. 502 Rather, such vague-
ness would simply argue against enforcing the particular contract
involved. 503 Thus, to argue that vagueness or ambiguity creates a
burden on the First Amendment is simply not a valid criticism of
reporter-source confidentiality agreements where the particular
agreement involved is not vague or ambiguous.
Moreover, if the terms of a particular agreement are ambiguous
and would create a heavy burden on First Amendment freedoms,
normal rules of contract requiring definite terms of agreement
would serve to eliminate the particularly constitutionally burden-
some claims without resort to a per se rule.'" The district court's
decision in Ruzicka is a good example of this contract law policing
mechanism.905 Because the court could not find clear terms of agree-
ment, it held that a valid waiver of First Amendment protections
could not have been made and refused to enforce the agreement."6
s°° See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying. text for a discussion of the neutral
principles analysis as it applies to the state action issue. This note follows similar reasoning
to conclude that court enforcement of a reporter-source agreement would place little or no
burden on the First Amendment.
"I See supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of how vagueness or
ambiguity of an agreement can cause a burden on First Amendment freedoms.
.Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen II"), 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990), reztd,
I11 S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III"). See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Minnesota Supreme Court's conclusion that vagueness does not
support a per se rule of non-enforcement.
5" Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 203.
"4 See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the problem
of vagueness is simply a problem of proof that can be resolved through normal contract law
principles.
505 See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ruzicka court's
handling of the vagueness issue.
" Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1298 (D. Minn. 1990),
modified, 939 F.2d 578, 584 (8th Cir. 1991).
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Finally, the argument presented by Judge Crippen in his Cohen
I dissent regarding .the private waiver of a public right is also un-
persuasive." 7 Judge Crippen reasoned that the public's right to
information could not be waived by a reporter. 308
 Again, given that
confidentiality agreements are part of the editorial process, no rel-
evant distinction exists between a decision by a news organization
to enter a confidentiality agreement and a decision by a news or-
ganization not to publish a non-newsworthy item."9
 Thus, unless
Judge Crippen is willing to argue that news entities should never
be able to select what information is to be published because news
entities, by themselves, cannot waive the public's First Amendment
rights, his argument is unpersuasive.
If reporter-source confidentiality agreements are regarded as
extensions of the editorial process, as they should be, the arguments
that such agreements place a heavy burden on the First Amendment
are much less persuasive. The fundamental consensual nature of
these agreements ensures that the news organization is free to ex-
ercise its business judgment on whether to enter the agreement.
Thus, the burden on First Amendment rights is minimal.
2. Strong Need for Enforcement
Courts and commentators have advanced a variety of argu-
ments demonstrating a strong need to enforce reporter-source con-
fidentiality agreements. 31° Contract law problems, on the other
hand, have led some courts considering such agreements to con-
clude that they should not be enforced."' Assuming traditional
safeguards of contract law are observed, however, there is, on bal-
ance, a strong need to enforce these agreements.
The loss of confidentiality can cause serious harm to the
source." 2 In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the source, Dan Cohen,
'°' See supra notes 259-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Crippen's
argument.
'°
	 v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen I"), 445 N.W.2d 248, 267 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(Crippen, J., dissenting), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990) ("Cohen
II"), rettd, Ill S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III").
mi See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reporter-
source confidentiality agreement as an extension of the editorial process.
"° See supra notes 230-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the arguments
favoring enforcement of reporter-source agreements.
' 11 See supra notes 92-139 and accompanying text for a discussion of the contract law
problems surrounding the reporter-source agreement.
512 See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the loss of
confidentiality can damage the source.
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suffered the loss of his job and damage to his reputation." Courts
need to redress the damages caused by the breach of confidentiality
agreements because they are often substantial.
Aside from damages to the individual source, the breach of
confidentiality agreements can damage the news organization it-
self.'" Reporters and their employers rely heavily upon confidential
sources for much of the information that they receive." Indeed,
reporters traditionally felt obligated, both morally and profession-
ally, to perform their part of the confidentiality agreement. 9 t 6 Re-
cently, however, reporters have been more willing to breach confi-
dentiality, exacerbating the reporter-source agreement problem. 317
Viewing these agreements as extensions of the editorial process,"
if courts choose not to enforce them, in the long run, sources will
no longer rely upon them." The result, then, will be to take an
important tool for the acquisition of information out of the hands
of editors and reporters.
Also, the notion of allowing reporters to be shielded by such
agreements, on the one hand, and allowing them to breach with
impunity, on the other, is fundamentally inconsistent and trouble-
some.324 If reporters are afforded the privilege of not being subject
to normal contract law when they breach, their argument for having
some special reporter-source privilege not to disclose is under-
"' Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen I"), 445 N.W.2d 248, 253-54 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989), aff 'd in part, rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990) ("Cohen In, rev'd, 1 l 1
S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen !In.
314 See supra notes 238, 241-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various
ways in which a news organization's own interests may be damaged by a decision to breach
a reporter-source confidentiality agreement.
315 Dicke, supra note 3, at 1563. This commentator noted, "[j]ournalists regularly rely
on confidential sources for a significant amount of the information they obtain' . . ITJoday
[1989], studies show that eighty percent of national news magazine articles and fifty percent
of national wire service stories rely on confidential sources." Id.
315 See id. at 1564-65. This commentator noted that "Ejlournalists have a long tradition
of protecting their confidential sources . . . . They fear that if they become known for
breaching confidentiality agreements, existing and potential sources will 'dry up' . . . In
addition, reporters feel a strong ethical and moral commitment to keeping their promises of
confidentiality." Id.
517 Langley & Levine, supra note 240, at 21-22.
313 See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reporter-
source confidentiality agreement as an extension of the editorial process.
319 See supra note 238 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possibility that
sources will become reluctant to give information should courts choose not to enforce re-
porter-source agreements.
n° Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen In, 457 N.W.2d 199, 206 (Minn. 1990) (Yetka,
J., dissenting), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) ("Cohen III").
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mined. 3" Thus, the argument against enforcing such agreements
has undermined other important interests of the news organization
itself in two ways. First, not enforcing the agreement tends to take
an important tool for information gathering out of the news orga-
nization's hands. Second, not enforcing the agreement tends to
undermine the news industry's argument for refusing to reveal
sources. This damage caused to news organizations, when coupled
with the damage to the individual source, creates a powerful ar-
gument for enforcing reporter-source confidentiality agreements.
One might argue that if news entities are themselves damaged,
the problem will police itself because the news entities will have an
interest in keeping their promises. Though this argument may be
true to some extent, there will certainly be times when, after weigh-
ing this possibility against their own desire to publish the confiden-
tial information, the news entity will still choose to breach the agree-
ment. Cases will still arise, then, in which sources are injured.
Moreover, this self-policing argument circumvents a central pur-
pose of contract law—enforcing promises rather than permitting
one party to choose when to breach its promises at the other party's
expense.
With regard to any contract law problems that arise in the
context of reporter-source agreements, a court's application of nor-
mal rules of contract law can adequately guard against such prob-
lems on a case-by-case basis. 322 For example, in Cohen, the defendant
newspapers argued that the vagueness of reporter-source agree-
ments should prevent courts from enforcing these agreements. 323
The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded, however, that such prob-
lems should be addressed only with regard to the enforceability of
the particular agreement at issue and not all such agreements. 3" If
a case, then, presents a clear offer, acceptance and consideration in
which both parties know the specific consequences of their actions,
the vagueness rationale simply does not apply.
An application of normal rules of contract will also suffice to
guard against the problem of ascertaining the parties' specific in-
32 ' See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the way in which
non-enforcement may undermine the news industry's argument in favor of creating a re-
porter-source privilege.
S22 See supra notes 92-139 and accompanying text for a discussion of the contract law
issues.
3" Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 203.
324 Id.
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tentions upon entering the contract. 325 If it is clear from the objec-
tive conduct or circumstances that either party did not intend to be
bound, such an agreement would not be enforceable under normal
contract law. If, on the other hand, both parties appeared serious
about entering the agreement, the objective theory of contracts
allows both parties to rely on the fact that the other party will
perform or will be liable for breach. 326
In Cohen II, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided that a true
contract could not be found and went on, therefore, to consider
promissory estoppe1. 327 If, however, the court had found a true
contract, there would be no need to consider promissory estoppel
because a promissory estoppel analysis is used only to imply a con-
tract in law where a contract in fact cannot be found. 328 The Cohen
II court (as well as the Cohen III Court) also reasoned persuasively
that under a promissory estoppel theory, it could not be neutral as
to the First Amendment. 329 Where a court must consider whether
it would be an injustice not to enforce the agreement, it must give
up the cloak of neutrality and take up the sword of active interven-
tion. 33° Because the promissory estoppel remedy requires the active
involvement of the court in imposing an agreement upon the par-
ties, both the Cohen II and Cohen III courts concluded that sufficient
state action existed to implicate the First Amendment."'
Though the use of the promissory estoppel analysis involves
such active intervention, this fact does not mean that the agreement
is automatically unenforceable. As in any case where state action is
found, the court must still apply the balancing test, weighing the
need to enforce against the First Amendment concerns.332 Indeed,
given the minimal nature of the First Amendment concerns, 333 such
a balancing test should often favor enforcement of the agreement.
325 See supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problem of
determining the parties' intentions.
325 See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the objective theory
of contracts.
525 Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 203-05.
525 Id. at 203.
]49
	 at 204-05; see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ("Cohen III"), 111 S. Ct. 2513,
2517-18 (1991).
3" Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 204-05.
351 Cohen III, ill S. Ct. at 2518; Cohen II, 457 N.W.2d at 204-05.
332 See supra notes 222-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the balancing test
that is employed where a constitutional burden is discovered.
353 See supra notes 298-309 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unpersuasive
nature of the arguments demonstrating a First Amendment burden,
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Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court concluded in
Cohen III, the doctrine of promissory estoppel, given that it is a
generally applicable rule that does not in any way single out news
organizations, does not directly collide with First Amendment in-
terests. 334 Rather, its impact upon the editorial process can be seen
as an incidental consequence of applying the generally applicable
rule to the press. 333 The press should not be granted special im-
munity from a generally applicable state law doctrine simply because
of this incidental effect upon First Amendment interests. 338
Though the Minnesota Supreme Court in Cohen II did not come
to this conclusion, that court based its decision not to enforce under
promissory estoppel on the particular facts of the case rather than
on a fundamental incompatibility of reporter-source agreements
with the promissory estoppel doctrine. 337 Indeed, the court noted
that, given other facts, a promissory estoppel analysis might be
applicable. 338 Thus, absent the "dirty tricks" in Cohen, and given
that an injustice would have resulted if the agreement were not
enforced, even the Cohen II court would have concluded that the
need to enforce under a promissory estoppel theory outweighed
any First Amendment interests. After Cohen III, however, it appears
that any application of promissory estoppel in the reporter-source
agreement context will be held not to violate the First Amendment
given the generally applicable nature of the promissory estoppel
remedy.
The decision whether to grant the promissory estoppel remedy
in the reporter-source agreement context, then, should turn more
upon the equities of the situation (as with any equitable remedy)
than upon a concern for the First Amendment interests involved.
While state action does exist because of the equitable character of
the remedy, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Cohen III demon-
strated that the First Amendment interests are really insignificant
and tangential. The central issue to be decided is whether the
aggrieved source involved deserves the equitable remedy. Once
554 See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Cohen III.
535 See Cohen III, 11 I S. Ct. at 2519.
"' Id.
"' Cohen //, 457 N.W.2d at 205.
"a Id. The court stated that Itlhere may be instances where a confidential source would
be entitled to a remedy such as promissory estoppel, when the state's interest in enforcing
the promise to the source outweighs First Amendment considerations, but this is not such a
case." Id.
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again, as with the difficulties regarding vagueness and the intentions
of the parties, the problem of weighing the equities of the situation
can and should be handled through the normal state law principles
governing promissory estoppel. A per se rule barring enforcement
of reporter-source confidentiality agreements through promissory
estoppel is simply inappropriate and unnecessary given the lack of
a real First Amendment burden.
Close attention to the state law rules of contract and promissory
estoppel, then, will adequately guard against the various objections
that courts and commentators have raised as grounds for not en-
forcing reporter-source confidentiality agreements. The problems
of vagueness, intentions of the parties, and promissory estoppel,
properly considered, demonstrate no need to impose a per se ban
on enforcement of such agreements. Moreover, the interests in
enforcing the contracts, both for news organizations and their
sources, are great.
3. Result of the Balancing Test
The enforcement of reporter-source confidentiality agreements
would place a minimal burden on the First Amendment. 339 Viewing
confidentiality agreements as extensions of the editorial process,
and given the consensual nature of such agreements, news organi-
zations are free to choose exactly what information they will publish.
Conversely, the need to enforce such agreements is often great. 34°
Given a court's careful attention to contract law and given factual
circumstances involving a clear agreement, breach and damages,
the need to enforce substantially outweighs the minimal burden on
the First Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
An analysis of reporter-source confidentiality agreements in-
dicates that they should be enforced in the same manner as other
business agreements. First, the consensual nature of contracts,
which allows news organizations the freedom to decide when, and
on what terms, to enter an agreement, means that court enforce-
ment of such agreements does not rise to the level of state action
"9 See supra notes 298-309 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unpersuasive
nature of the arguments demonstrating a First Amendment burden.
34° See supra notes 310-38 and accompanying text for an analysis of the interests favoring
enforcement of reporter-source agreements.
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sufficient to implicate the Constitution. Second, even if state action
exists, little disagreement has arisen among courts construing such
agreements that, given clear contractual terms, a reporter may ef-
fectively waive First Amendment rights by entering the contract.
Finally, if the First Amendment is nonetheless held to apply, a
balancing of the First Amendment burden against the need to
enforce calls for enforcement of the agreement. The burden on the
First Amendment, given the reality that confidentiality agreements
are simply extensions of the editorial process, is not as great as it
first appears. Conversely, the harmful effects of not enforcing the
contract, both to the media and to the source, are substantial. As-
suming close attention to the state law rules of contract and prom-
issory estoppel, the balancing test indicates that courts should en-
force reporter-source agreements in the same manner as with any
contract.
Under any of these lines of reasoning, then, the reporter-source
confidentiality agreement should be both enforceable and enforced.
Special immunity from the law should not be given to reporters
and news organizations in any context, absent a real First Amend-
ment burden."' Such a burden simply does not exist in the case of
reporter-source confidentiality agreements.
TIMOTHY J. FALLON
3" Judge Yetka's dissent in Cohen II contained a strong objection to extending special
immunity from contract law to reporters:
[C]ontract law, it now seems, applies only to millions of ordinary people. It is
unconscionable to allow the press, on the one hand, to hide behind the shield
of confidentiality when it does not want to reveal the source of its information;
yet, on the other hand, to violate confidentiality agreements with impunity when
it decides that disclosing the source will help make its story more sensational
and profitable.
Cohen II, 457 N.W.2cl at 206 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
